Abstract. Wireless sensor networks have relatively weaker security performance compared to wired ones, and the MAC layer is a key part of their security system. In MAC layer, multiple synergetic attacks are more destructive than single attacks and more difficult to detect. In this paper, we propose a synthetical malicious behavior detection framework to detect when multiple attacks are launched in MAC layer. In this detection framework, we design a hierarchical data collection system to collect the necessary data for detection and propose the notion of behavioral deviation to roundly evaluate multiple aspects of behavior in MAC layer. Furthermore, we design a detection algorithm based on a hypothesis testing model to approximate the identity of malicious nodes. Finally, we prove the superiority of the synthetical detection framework compared with other kinds of single detection methods through simulation.
In this detection framework, SNs collect both medium access and frame dropping data and sends them to the CH. The CH disposes the data and calculates the deviations of different malicious behaviors with an algorithm designed by us. Then deviations from different behaviors are coalesced together and evaluated using a hypothesis testing model to detect whether a node is malicious node. The scientific contributions of this paper include:
A novel synthetical malicious behavior detection framework able to detect multiple MAC layer attacks containing small backoff window attacks and frame-dropping attacks, which also has better detection accuracy than existing detection methods which are usable on only one kind of attack.
We propose the notion of behavior deviation, which evaluates differences between the behavior of the node under detection and the behavior of standard nodes. Behavior deviation makes it possible to evaluate multiple aspects of node behavior as a whole, and promotes accuracy and robustness of detection frameworks.
This paper propose an algorithm to calculate the total behavior deviation of each node in a WSN, and estimate whether the node is a malicious node by evaluating the total behavior deviation based on a hypothesis testing model. Subsequent sections of the paper are organized as follows: In Section II, we introduce two typical types of attacks in the MAC layer, the small backoff window attack and the frame-dropping attack, summarizing their behavioral features. In Section III, we propose a novel synthetical malicious behavior detection framework and related algorithm to detect multiple MAC layer attacks in a WSN. In Section IV, we evaluate the performance of the synthetical detection framework through simulation, comparing this detection framework with other existing detection methods. Conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
Multiple Attacks in Mac Layer
The MAC layer protocol regulates the channel access and the transmission process of every node. Wireless networks, including WSNs, mostly adopt the 802.11 protocol as their MAC layer protocol. In the 802.11 protocol, a node constantly overhears the channel if it has no data to transmit. If the node has something to transmit, it waits for a certain duration called DIFS (Distributed Coordination Function Inter-Frame Spacing). After that, the node randomly waits for another additional period called backoff time. The backoff time is a random duration set in the range of zero to contention window size (CW). During the backoff period, if a collision occurs, the backoff timer will pause and wait for the channel to be free again before resuming. After the backoff period finishes, the node implements its transmission. If a collision occurs during the transmission, the source node doubles its contention window and repeats the transmission process. If the source node transmits successfully, it resets its contention window to the preset size [6] .
In this protocol, a malicious node may be able to launch many kinds of attacks, small backoff window attack and frame-dropping attack are two of the most typical types among them.
The small backoff window attack aims to illegally obtain priority channel access by lessening the contention window without permission and refusing to increase it. Malicious node can use this kind of attack to constantly monopolize the channel and stop the transmission of other nodes, which causes serious congestion and disturbs normal services in the network.
The frame-dropping attack is another typical attack on the MAC layer. The progression of this kind of attack is very simple. In the multi-hop network, nodes should not only send their own data, but also transmit data for other nodes. Malicious nodes in the network refuse to transmit data for other nodes by dropping all or a part of their frames in the MAC layer. This kind of attack can also cause serious chaos or even shut down the whole network.
These two kinds of attack are easy to detect by the latest detection methods. For example, we can calculate the medium access or numbers of frames dropped in the MAC layer and compare them with the standard figures to detect small backoff window and frame-dropping attacks [7] . As a result, attackers have found more convert ways to implement attacks. In this paper, we consider cases in which a multiple attack contains both small backoff-time and frame-dropping attacks. In this kind of multiple attack, an attacker probabilistically implements the two kinds of attack in order to reduce the probability of detection without sharply decreasing the intensity of total malicious behaviors. However, most existing detection methods aim at only a certain type of malicious behavior, while in multiple attacks, each kind of malicious behavior is very low intensity, which makes it very difficult to detect this form of attack based on existing detection methods.
Multiple Attack Detection Algorithm
In this section, we designed an algorithm which can detect two kinds of malicious behavior, taking the behavior of both small backoff window and frame-dropping attacks into account at the same time and evaluate them under a proper standard. To detect these two kinds of attacks, we monitor the transmission times and number of frames dropped at each node and pick out any abnormally large figure.
To collect the necessary data, we use the hierarchical trust management system [1] for reference. In a cluster-based WSN, SNs undertake the job of data collection and CHs undertake the job of data operation. Thus, we set up a process where each SN monitors adjacent SNs and collect data on their transmission times and number of frames dropped during a node observation period Δt. After each observation period ends, the SNs send the related data to their CH. After the CH receives data from all SNs, it calculates the SBW and FD behavior deviations.
To get the behavior deviation for each of the two kinds of malicious behavior, we have to calculate the standard figures for transmission time and dropped frames. We propose an optimal method to obtain these standard figures.
In the WSN, we first choose several reliable nodes as standard nodes, and the CH calculates their average transmission times and number of frames dropped as the standard figures before each estimation process. According to the simulation result, the standard figures based on this calculation have the best accuracy and flexibility.
The behavior deviation of SBW in j th observation period can be calculated as
where the w ij is the total transmission time of node i in the j th observation period and the w sj is the standard figure for transmission time in the j th observation period. The calculation of behavior deviation of FD is similar, it can be calculated as
where the d ij is the total number of dropped frames at node i in the j th observation period and the d sj is the standard figure of dropped frames in the j th observation period. By calculating behavior deviation for SBW and FD, we can evaluate the two kinds of malicious behavior at the same order of magnitude. The CH then calculates the total behavior deviation of node i with the equation below. = + (3) For a normal SN, the behavior deviation of SBW and FD should be around 0. However, for a malicious node, its number of transmission times or dropped frames will be larger than the standard figures, so the total behavior deviation will be obviously larger than 0. So we can therefore estimate whether the SN is a malicious node by hypothesis testing.
To meet the required detection accuracy and energy limits, we set an estimation period ΔT. ΔT can be expressed as = (4) where Δt is the node observation period and n is a positive integer.
The CH calculates the standard deviation, S i , of behavior deviation of node i in an estimation period ΔT. This can be calculated using the equation below
With the values of S i and D i obtained, we can implement the hypothesis testing process. Here, we adopt the t-distribution hypothesis testing model, and calculate the value t used for estimation.
= √ − 1 (6) t is then compared with the fractile of the t-distribution t α (v) . The rule of estimation is
where H 0 means node i is a legal node and H 1 means node i is a malicious node.
Simulation Result
We adopt Matlab 2015a as our simulation tool. An ad-hoc network was set up containing one CH and 60 SNs to simulate a WSN cluster, the simulation parameters are shown in Table 1 . For PHY layer simulation, the transmission rate is set at 2×10 6 b/s and the bit error rate at 10 -6 . For the MAC layer, the 802.11 DCF protocol is implemented, with initial contention window size set at 32, and maximum contention window size as 1024. The node drops its current frame if the contention window reaches maximum size. The contention window size of the malicious node implementing the SBW attack is set at 8 and does not increase, contrary to the exponential backoff rules. The time taken for messages sent to arrive in the MAC layer follows the Poisson distribution. In all corresponding hypothesis testing process, we set the confidence level at 0.95.
To evaluate the performance of the synthetical malicious behavior detection framework, we compare the detection probability and false-alarm probability of both the synthetical malicious behavior detection framework and single detection methods. We choose two single detection methods for comparison. Method I, considers only SBW attacks, and collects the transmission times of each node, comparing them with standard figures based on the hypothesis testing model. Method II is similar to Method I, it implement an estimation process using the number of dropped frames.
We consider the performance of different methods under different attack intensities. In the multiple attacks, SBW and FD attacks have the same probability of occurrence, which is the half the total intensity. We also compare the detection probability and false-alarm probability of the synthetical malicious behavior detection framework and the two single detection methods. Figure 1 and figure 2 shows the detection probability and the false-alarm probability of the three detection methods under different intensities of attack. From figure 1 and table 2, we can see that the performance of the synthetical malicious behavior detection framework is much better than that of the single detection methods.
Summary
In this paper, we propose a novel synthetical detection framework aimed at multiple attack in the MAC layer, which is more elusive and destructive than single attack methods. The synthetical detection framework adopts the notion of hierarchical system to collect the necessary data while reducing the cost of storage and channel resource. The biggest innovation in the synthetical detection framework is the multiple attack detection algorithm, which roundly consider the abnormal behavior of SBW and FD attacks and evaluate such behavior using behavioral deviation. With behavioral deviation, we can estimate the identity of each node in a WSN and determine whether it is a malicious node. Finally, we examine this synthetical detection framework using simulations, and prove that the performance of the synthetical detection framework is much better than other single detection methods. In future, we can improve the detection system by increasing the variety of attack which it takes into consideration, and optimizing the algorithm for better accuracy.
